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Incentive Mechanism and Content Provider
Selection for Device-to-Device-based Content
Sharing
Jianzhang He, Haibo Wang, Member, IEEE, Xiaoli Chu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Tao Zhang
Abstract—Content sharing based on device-to-device (D2D)
communications has been regarded as a promising technology to
offload traffic from the overburdened cellular networks. Effective
and efficient D2D content sharing requires an incentive mecha-
nism to encourage mobile devices to participate and an optimized
content-provider selection if multiple candidate providers exist.
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive scoring mechanism
(CSM), which calculates a score for each candidate content
provider based on their historical content supply record, current
transmission rate and expected reward. The CSM establishes the
relationship between the historical content supply record and
the expected reward, and makes it possible to select the content
provider with an achievable transmission rate appropriate for
the requested content. Based on the CSM and the Hungarian
algorithm, we propose a content-sharing incentive and provider
selection (CIPS) algorithm to optimize the selection of content
providers for multiple concurrent content requesters. Through
extensive simulations, we show that the proposed CIPS algorithm
can effectively motivate mobile devices to participate in content
sharing and can select the most appropriate content provider(s)
from multiple candidates.
Index Terms—device-to-device communications, content-
sharing, Hungarian algorithm, incentive, provider selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing demand for various mobile services
and applications, cellular networks are expected to face a
capacity crunch in the near future. In order to offload traffic
from the cellular eNodeBs (eNBs), device-to-device (D2D)
communications [1] underlaying cellular systems have been
widely considered in the design of the fifth-generation (5G)
mobile systems. [2] proposed a D2D communication assisted
mobile traffic offloading (DATO) scheme, with focus on mas-
sive connections for machine type communications . In [3], the
authors used unmanned Aerial Vehicles to be a good candidate
to promptly construct the D2D-enabled wireless network in
remote, rural and disaster affected areas. Furthermore, [4]
studied the problem of delay-constrained data transmission in
mobile opportunistic D2D networks and authors investigated
the joint resource block assignment and transmit power allo-
cation problem to optimize the network performance in [5].
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Actually, there are a large number of scenes to use D2D
networks. For example, if the content that user equipment
(UE) wants to download from the Internet is available on some
nearby UEs, then one of them can be selected to provide the
requested content via D2D communications [6]. This is called
D2D based content sharing, or D2D offloading, which can
significantly reduce the traffic load of the cellular networks
and improve the network spectral efficiency. However, D2D
based content sharing faces two major challenges: i) how to
motivate UEs to actively participate in content sharing; ii) how
to select proper content providers from candidates and ensure
the quality of service (QoS) simultaneously.
Recently, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed
to promote cooperation among UEs for content sharing. They
generally can be classified into two categories: reputation-
based and price-based. In a reputation-based incentive mecha-
nism [7]-[12], a node’s reputation is built based on a collection
of feedbacks from other nodes. A pre-defined reputation
threshold is used to classify nodes into reputed and selfish
nodes. Only the reputed nodes can enjoy high QoS transmis-
sions from BSs and other nodes. In this case, a clever node can
manage to be considered as a reputed node by maintaining its
reputation just above the threshold. This will discourage the
nodes from actively participating in content sharing to increase
their reputation further above the threshold.
Price-based incentive mechanisms [13]-[19] treat content-
sharing services as transactions that can be priced. The authors
of [13] adopted the contract theory in resource allocation. A
contract-based relay selection scheme was proposed in [14].
In [15], a cheat-proof, credit based system for stimulating
cooperation among selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks
was developed. The authors of [16] proposed price competition
incentive mechanisms for bandwidth trading and allocation. In
[17] and [18], virtual currency and micro payment were used
to reward upload and charge download, respectively. A linear
pricing scheme that maximizes the revenue of the network
manager was investigated in [19]. However, the aforemen-
tioned price-based incentive mechanisms consider only the
current transaction, regardless of UE behavior in the long term.
In addition, incentive mechanisms [20]-[21] based on game
theory have proposed incentive mechanisms designed by the-
ory, methods and models in the game theoretic approach and
Stackelberg game approach. In [20], authors investigated the
profit maximization problem for wireless network carrier and
payment minimization for end-users. A marketplace based on
risk sharing concept is achieved where the tension between
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carrier and end-users and the competition between end-users
themselves has been formulated as a Stackelberg game. In
[21], authors proposed an incentive mechanism in which the
base station rewards those users that share contents with oth-
ers with D2D communications. They formulated the conflict
among utility for each user and the tension between the BS
and the users as a Stackelberg game.
In this paper, we first propose a comprehensive scoring
mechanism (CSM) for D2D content sharing. In CSM, the
comprehensive score of each candidate content provider is
the summation of three scores: the score of historical content
supply record (which is different from the reputation-based
mechanisms [7]-[12] in that a continuous valued score is
calculated to represent the historical content supply record
instead of simply using a pre-defined reputation threshold to
classify nodes into reputed and selfish ones), the score of
current transmission rate (which makes it possible to select
the content provider with a transmission rate right for the
requested content), and the score of the expected reward
(which takes into account both the current and long-term UE
performance as indicated by the other two scores).
The proposed CSM can effectively motivate UEs’ partic-
ipation in D2D content sharing because: on the one hand,
a candidate provider with a higher reputation will have a
higher probability of being selected and receiving a higher
reward, which can avoid the UE behavior of maintaining a
reputation just above the threshold [12]; on the other hand,
UEs will need to actively participate in D2D content sharing
in the long term for achieving a high reputation so as to
receive a high reward. In addition, we introduce the concept
of QoS sensitivity threshold. If the disparity of transmission
duration due to different data rates is less than the QoS
sensitivity threshold, then the score of current transmission rate
will be considered less important than the other two scores;
otherwise, the score of current transmission rate will be put
more emphasis on in order to ensure the QoS.
When multiple UEs request contents concurrently, it would
be difficult (if not impossible) to select the best content
provider for each content requester at the same time. In
this paper, we model this problem as an optimization that
maximizes the total score of the selected content providers for
all the concurrent content requesters, and devise a content-
sharing incentive and provider selection (CIPS) algorithm
based on the CSM and the Hungarian algorithm [26] to solve
the optimization problem. The CIPS algorithm includes two
steps: 1) for each content requester, calculate the scores of all
potential providers by using CSM; 2) arrange the scores of
potential providers for all concurrent content requesters into a
matrix and find the content providers whose total score is the
largest for all the content requesters by using the Hungarian
algorithm.
The novelty of the proposed CSM and CIPS can be sum-
marized as follows:
• We establish the relationship between the historical con-
tent supply record and the expected reward of a candidate
content provider. The expected reward is increased for
a content provider every time it has successfully and
safely shared content. As a result, UEs can be effectively
motivated to actively participate in D2D content sharing
in the long term.
• We introduce the QoS sensitivity threshold in order to
ensure that the selected content provider has a transmis-
sion rate appropriate for the requested content size and
the associated QoS requirement.
• We formulate the problem of jointly optimizing the
selection of content providers for multiple concurrent
content requesters and use the Hungarian algorithm to
solve it. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has
not been studied in the related literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe the system model for content sharing based
on D2D communications underlaying cellular networks. The
proposed CSM is presented in Section III. In Section IV, the
CIPS algorithm is proposed. In Section V, we present the
simulation results. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Content Requester
Cellular UE
Interference Link
Content Provider
Transmission Link
Content Requester
Fig. 1. System model of D2D communication underlaying cellular networks
with uplink resource sharing.
A. Network Model
In this paper, we consider a single-cell Orthogonal Frequen-
cy Division Multiplexing (OFDM) cellular system where there
are M potential content providers (i.e., Q1, Q2, . . . , QM ), N
content requesters (i.e., d1, d2, . . . , dN ), and Z cellular UEs
(CUEs, i.e., C1, C2, . . . , CZ), whose uplink resources can be
reused by content providers for D2D communications, i.e.,
the underlay mode is assumed for D2D communications. We
assume that the content requested by any of the requesters has
been cached by at least one of the content providers.
We assume that potential content providers, content re-
questers and cellular UEs are all mobile UEs with pedestrian
speeds. If the requested file is very large, then it will be split
into multiple small sub-files that can be transmitted within the
channel coherence time, and the content provider selection
process will be performed for each sub-file separately. The
locations of the potential providers and the content requesters
follow two independent homogeneous Poisson point processes
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(PPPs) ΦQ and ΦD with density λQ and λD, respectively. The
CUEs are distributed following another independent PPP with
density of λI . For simplicity, it is assumed that all the content
providers and all the CUEs transmit with the constant power
µQ and µC (µQ ∈ (0, µmax), µC ∈ (0, µmax)), respectively.
The D2D content-sharing process includes the following
steps: 1) The content requester sends a content request to
its serving eNB. The content requesting message sent from
the requester to the eNB will be overhead by nearby content
providers. These content providers will estimate the channel
between them and the requester based on the overhead mes-
sage, and obtain an estimate of the achievable data rate. 2) The
eNB broadcasts the information of the requested content to the
UEs within the D2D communication range to the requester.
Only the UEs with the requested content will respond to the
eNB and the others will keep silent. 3) If there is no response
within a pre-defined period, which indicates that no potential
provider is around the requester, then the eNB will send the
content to the requester directly; otherwise, it will select the
best potential provider to send the content via a D2D link to
the requester. 4) The eNB will monitor the D2D transmission
process until the content requester has successfully received
the content. If the D2D content transmission process fails (e.g.,
a D2D link failure occurs or the D2D transmission rate falls
below the content requester’s minimum required data rate) at
some point, then the eNB will ask the selected content provider
to drop the D2D session and will complete the remaining
content transmission, and the reward to the selected content
provider will be decreased accordingly.
B. Channel Model
In the channel model, path loss is assumed to be inversely
proportional to the distance with the distance exponent α, and
all the links experience independent and identical frequency-
flat Rayleigh fading, which results in a unit-mean exponential
power distribution. Accordingly, the received power at the ith
content requester from the jth transmitter can be expressed as
µjhijL
−α
ij , where µj = µQ and µj = µC are the transmitter
power of Qj and Cj , respectivelyhij and Lij are the Rayleigh
fading power gain and the distance between the ith content
requester and the jth transmitter, respectively.
C. Interference Analysis
In this work, D2D communications share uplink resources
with CUEs. As shown in Fig.1, we consider that multiple con-
tent providers can share the uplink resources of a CUE, which
means the content sharing process will be completed before
the channel change significantly due to the low mobility. Since
one uplink resource block is assigned to at most one CUE in
a cell [11]-[13], the total interference to a content requester is
from one CUE Cv (assuming all uplink resource blocks are
in use) and all the other coexisting content-sharing D2D links
that reuse the same uplink resource. The potential providers
with requested contents for all content requesters in a cell form
a set ΦS . Assuming that Qk(k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) is selected as
the content provider for content requester di(i ∈ {1, . . . , N}),
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) of di can be
expressed as:
γk,i =
µQL
−α
ik hik
µChivL
−α
iv +
∑
j∈ΦS\Qk
µQhijL
−α
ij + σ
2 (1)
where σ2 is the power of the additive white Gaussian noise,
Liv and Lij(k) are the distances from interfering CUE Cv and
from provider Qj(k) to content requester di, respectively, hiv
and hij(k) are the Rayleigh fading power gains between Cv
and di, and between Qj(k) and di, respectively.
Accordingly, the transmission rate (in bit/s/Hz) from content
provider Qk to content requester di is given by
Rk,i = log2(1 + γk,i) (2)
III. COMPREHENSIVE SCORING MECHANISM
In this section, we propose the CSM to calculate a com-
prehensive score of every potential content provider for each
requester. The comprehensive score of a UE is the sum of the
following three scores:
• The score of the historical content supply record, which
shows how a UE has participated in content-sharing
previously. (Note: the historical content supply record of
each UE is stored in the network and can be accessed
and modified by eNB s.)
• The score of the currently achievable transmission rate,
which is estimated by each UE under the current channel
condition. If the actual transmission rate is lower than the
estimated achievable transmission rate, the actual reward
paid by the eNB will be less than the expected reward.
• The score of the expected reward, which consists of the
transmission cost and a profit.
Accordingly, the comprehensive score of content provider
Qj can be calculated as
STj = aS
H
j + bS
R
j + cS
P
j , (3)
in which SHj , S
R
j and S
P
j denote the score of historical
content supply record, the score of current transmission rate,
and the score of expected reward of content provider Qj ,
respectively. a ∈ 0, 1, b ∈ 0, 1 and c ∈ 0, 1 are adjusted
coefficient to determine which score is more important in
different situations. If provider Qj doesn’t have the content
requested by requester di, S
T
j = 0; otherwise, the values of
SHj , S
R
j and S
P
j will be calculated as follows.
A. Score of Historical Content Supply Record
In market transactions, a seller’s success depends not only
on good service and products, but also on the reputation
accumulated in many previous transactions. Similarly, a po-
tential provider with a better record of previous content supply
performance is more likely to provide a higher QoS and
would be more willing to participate in the current content
sharing. Moreover, in order to avoid unsafe, or even mali-
cious behavior (e.g., sending false content or even virus in
content sharing), the historical content-sharing safety record
of potential providers should be taken into account in addition
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to the historical content-sharing participation record. if the
eNB is reading the historical content supply record of one
content provider, the new supply record will not be wrote in
the database until this eNB finish the reading process. Based
on this type of designed, in the initial stage of collection for
the historical content supply record, there will be some impact
for selecting providers based on their historical supply score.
But, with the historical records accumulating, the impact will
be smaller and smaller.
We define the score of historical content supply record of
content provider Qj as
SHj =
1
2
(Wj +Gj) (4)
where Wj and Gj denote the score of historical content-
sharing participation record and the score of historical content-
sharing safety record of provider Qj , respectively, where
Wj ∈ [0, 1] and Gj ∈ [0, 1]. When the current content sharing
has been finished, the values of Wj and Gj will be updated
(as detailed below).
The initial value of Wj is 0. Once content provider Qj has
successfully accomplished one content-sharing transmission,
Wj grows by a positive constant value δ (0 < δ < 1).
If Qj has not participated in any content sharing during a
certain time period τ (i.e., a time threshold), then Wj will
be decreased by a value νj , which grows linearly with the
accumulated idle time Tj of content provider Qj when Tj
becomes larger than τ , i.e.,
νj =
{
0 Tj ≤ τ
Tj
τ
δ Tj > τ
(5)
where Tj is timed from the completion of the last content-
sharing participation to the start of the current content-sharing
participation. In addition, Tj will be reset to 0 after each
successful participation. From (5), we can see that if the idle
time is less than the time threshold τ , Wj remains unchanged;
otherwise, νj becomes larger than δ and Wj will be decreased
at a rate increasing with the accumulated idle time.
Thus, the value of Wj is updated according to content
provider Qj’s participation in D2D content sharing as follows,
Wj =
{
Wj + δ successful participation
Wj − νj no participation during Tj
(6)
Fig.2(a) shows the relationship between Wj and time t,
where we assume that at the end of the last content-sharing
participation Wj = 0.1, µ = 0.04 and τ = 2 (minute), and
provider Qj participates in content-sharing at t = 2, 5, 7, 8
(minute). Therefore, Wj increases by 0.04 at t = 2, 5, 7, 8
(minute). The idle time periods are 2 minutes (from t = 2 to
t = 4) and 4 minutes (from t = 8 to t = 12). Therefore, Wj
is decreased by 0.04 at t = 4, 10 and 12.
The initial value of Gj is ϑ, where ϑ > 0. The value
of Gj increases by a constant value ϕ (0 < ϕ < 1) every
time provider Qj participates a content-sharing transmission
without any unsafe behavior. If provider Qj is found to have
had any malicious behavior in a content-sharing process, then
the accumulated number (ιj , which is initially 0) of malicious
(a) Wj vs. t
(b) Gj vs. t
Fig. 2. The relationship between the score of historical content supply record
and the time period t of content provider Qj .
content-sharing behaviors of Qj is increased by 1 and Gj
reduces to one ιj
th of its previous value, i.e.,
Gj =
{
Gj + ϕ without any malicious behavior
1
ιj
Gj malicious behavior
(7)
Fig.2(b) shows the relationship between Gj and t, where we
assume that the initial value of Gj is 0.5, ϕ = 0.02, ιj = 1,
provider Qj completes a content-sharing transmission every
minute, and provider Qj has malicious behavior in content
sharing at t = 1, 5, 10 (minute). The value of Gj is updated
every 1 minute. We can see that Gj decreases by a factor of
1
2 ,
1
3 ,
1
4 at t = 1, 5, 10 (minute), respectively. In other periods,
Gj increases by 0.02 every time it completes a content-sharing
transmission safely.
For any potential content provider, Qj (j ∈ {1, ...,M}),
when it is considered for D2D content sharing for the first
time, its score of historical participation record and score of
historical safety record are initialized as Wj = 0 and Gj = ϑ,
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respectively. The values of Wj and Gj will then be updated
following (6) and (7), respectively, according to Qj’s behavior
in subsequent content sharing processes.
B. Score of Current Transmission Rate
In the context of D2D content sharing, we define the
score of current transmission rate in a way that links the
estimated achievable transmission rate to the size of the
requested content and the content requester’s sensitivity to
content transmission duration (i.e., the minimum difference
in transmission durations that can be perceived by the content
requester). For example, if the requested content has a size
of X bits and it is available at two candidate providers with
transmission rates of R and R − m, respectively, where m
(m > 0) is the difference between the two transmission rates,
then the difference between the transmission durations of the
two candidate providers is given by
Ωt = X(
1
R−m −
1
R
). (8)
Denoting ε as the content requester’s sensitivity to trans-
mission duration, which is defined as the QoS sensitivity
threshold, in order to keep Ωt ≤ ϵ, we need to have
m ≤ R
2ε
X +Rε
. (9)
When the transmission rate difference m satisfies (9), the
content requester would not notice the difference between the
content transmission durations of the two candidate providers.
In that case, the two candidate providers could have the same
score of current transmission rate.
We denote the estimated achievable transmission rate of
potential provider Qj as Rj (j = 1, ...,M), and rank the M
potential providers in the descending order of their rates, i.e.,
Qa1 , Qa2 , ..., QaM , where ai ∈ {1, ...,M}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
and Ra1 ≥ Ra2 ≥ · · · ≥ RaM . Based on the above discussion
and definitions, we define the relationship between the scores
of current transmission rate for potential providers Qaj+1 and
Qaj as follows,
SRaj+1 = S
R
aj
− bj (10)
where SRa1 = 1, bj ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,M − 1, and the value of bj
depends on the value of mj = Raj−Raj+1 . If mj ≤
R2aj
ε
X+Raj ε
,
then bj is given by
bj =
SRaj
ζ +
R2aj
ε
mj(X+Raj ε)
, (11)
where ζ > 0 is a parameter that can be used to adjust the
difference between scores of two adjacent ranked potential
providers, and the value of bj increases with mj . If mj >
R2aj
ε
X+Raj ε
, then bj is given by
bj = (1− 1
χ+
mj(X+Raj ε)
R2aj
ε
)SRaj (12)
where χ > 0 is a parameter that can be used to adjust the
value of bj , and bj increases with mj . By using (10)-(12) and
SRa1 = 1, the scores of current transmission rate for all the
potential providers can be calculated.
C. Score of Expected Reward
The score of expected reward for provider Qj is given by
SPj =
minMi=1(Pi)
Pj
(13)
where minMj=1(Pj) is the minimum expected reward of all
potential providers. Since a lower Pj leads to a higher S
P
j , the
eNB tends to select the potential provider requiring less profit
and less cost to share the content. Here, Pj is the expected
reward of potential provider Qj , which is defined as
Pj = Aj +Bj (14)
where Aj denotes the cost of Qj due to content-sharing
participation, i.e., the cost of energy consumed by transmitting
content from Qj to the content requester via D2D communi-
cations, and Aj can be expressed as
Aj = ρµQ
X
Rj
(15)
where ρ and µQ denote the cost per unit energy consumed
and the D2D transmit power for content sharing, respectively,
and X and Rj denote the size of the requested content and
the achievable D2D transmission rate estimated by Qj , X ∈
(0, Xmax).
In (14), Bj is the profit of provider Qj after having success-
fully completed a content-sharing transmission. Following the
market pricing model in [22], we assume that the M potential
providers are M competing suppliers in the market and define
Bj as
Bj =
exp(SHj −Υ)
M
Aj (16)
where Υ ∈ (0, 1) are adjustable parameters, and SHj denotes
the score of historical content supply record of provider Qj .
We can see that, profit Bj , which is calculated by the eNB ,
increases with SHj and decreases with M , which is send to
each potential provider by the eNB . On the one hand, a higher
score of historical content supply record is necessary for a
potential provider to gain a higher reward, which encourages
UEs to participate in content sharing actively and safely in
the long term. On the other hand, more potential providers
competing for supplying the same content will reduce the
profit, which will encourage UEs to respond more to content
requests with less potential providers available. Based on (15)
and (16), (14) can be rewritten as
Pj = ρµQ
X
Rj
(1 +
exp(SHj −Υ)
M
). (17)
in which SHj ∈ (0, 1), Υ ∈ (0, 1), M is a limited value in
[22], thus
exp(SHj −Υ)
M
and Pj are both bounded.
In the content-sharing process, the content requester will
send status information about the current D2D transmission
to the eNB . If the D2D transmission of content fails at some
point, the eNB will transmit the remaining content to the
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requester directly and the reward paid to the content provider
will be less than the expected reward accordingly. If the D2D
transmission fails after a size X ′ of the requested content has
been received by the requester, where X ′ < X , then the actual
reward P ′j is a fraction of the D2D content-sharing cost, i.e.,
P ′j =
X ′
X
Aj . (18)
If the D2D content-sharing transmission is finished, but
the actual transmission rate R′j is less than the estimated
achievable transmission rate Rj , then the actual reward P
′
j
is given by
P ′j =
R′j
Rj
Pj . (19)
IV. CONTENT-SHARING INCENTIVE AND PROVIDER
SELECTION ALGORITHM
Based on the CSM proposed in Section III, the content
provider with the highest score among all the potential
providers can be selected for each content requester separately.
However, when the N content requesters request contents
concurrently, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to select
the best content provider from the M potential providers for
each content requester at the same time. In this section, we
will formulate and solve the problem of optimally assigning
content providers to multiple requesters.
A. Problem Formulation
Without loss of generality, we assume that the N content
requesters share the same set of M potential providers, al-
though different requesters may request different contents.
Based on CSM, a score, Si,j , is calculated of provider Qj for
content requester di (i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ...,M). Then, each
of the originally calculated score is normalized as follows,
Si,j =
Si,j
maxM
j=1
(Si,j)
, so that Si,j ∈ [0, 1]. All the normalized
scores are arranged into an M -by-N matrix S, i.e.,
S =


S1,1 S2,1 . . . SN,1
S1,2 S2,2 . . . SN,2
...
...
...
S1,M S2,M . . . SN,M


We define an M -by-N indicator matrix, Y = [yi,j ], where
yi,j = 1 indicates that provider Qj is selected for requester
di, otherwise yi,j = 0. The problem of jointly optimizing the
selection of content providers for multiple content requesters
can be formulated into the following optimization problem,
which maximizes the sum of scores of all the selected content
providers, i.e.,
Y
∗ = argmax
Y
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Si,jyi,j (20)
s.t.


N∑
i=1
yi,j ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M},
M∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
yi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
If M ≥ N , N different providers can be selected for the N
content requesters. If M < N , M providers are selected for
M content requesters and the eNB will send the contents to
the other N −M requesters. In the following, we present two
lemmas to simplify the above optimization problem.
Lemma 1: If M = N , matrix S remains unchanged. If
M < N , we append (N −M) rows of 0 ’s to matrix S to
transform it into an N ×N square matrix S′:
S′ =


S1,1 S2,1 . . . SN,1
S1,2 S2,2 . . . SN,2
...
...
...
S1,M S2,M . . . SN,M
0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0


If M > N , we append (M −N) columns of 0 to matrix S to
transform it into an M ×M square matrix S′′:
S′′ =


S1,1 S2,1 . . . SN,1 0 . . . 0
S1,2 S2,2 . . . SN,2 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
S1,M S2,M . . . SN,M 0 . . . 0


Then, replacing S with S′ (S′′) and replacing M with N (N
with M ) and increasing the size of Y = [yi,j ] into N -by-N
(M -by-M ) in (20) if M < N (if M > N ), the solution to the
optimization problem (20) will not be changed.
Proof : The objective function with S′ can be expressed as
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
S′i,jyi,j =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Si,jyi,j +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=M+1
S′i,jyi,j (21)
Since S′i,j = 0 for j = M + 1, . . . , N , we have
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=M+1
S′i,jyi,j = 0 (22)
Thus, the objective function with S′ is the same as the original
objective function with S, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Si,jyi,j =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
S′i,jyi,j . (23)
Similarly, it can be proven that the objective function with
S′′ is the same as the original objective function with S as well.
Lemma 2: Let
K = max(S′i,j), i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , N (24)
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Fi,j = K − S′i,j (25)
We arrange Fi,j(i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; j = 1, 2, . . . , N) into the
following N ×N matrix
F =


F1,1 F2,1 . . . FN,1
F1,2 F2,2 . . . FN,2
...
...
...
F1,N F2,N . . . FN,N


The optimization problem in (20) can be converted to
Y
∗ = argmin
Y
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Fi,jyi,j (26)
s.t.


N∑
i=1
yi,j ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
N∑
j=1
yi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
yi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
The solution to the optimization problem in (26) is the solution
to (20).
Proof :
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(Fi,j)yi,j =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Kyi,j −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
S′i,jyi,j (27)
Because
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Kyi,j = NK or 0, minimizing the left-
hand side is equivalent to maximizing the second term (without
the minus sign) on the right-hand side, which is the same as
the objective function in (20) according to Lemma 1.
B. Hungarian Algorithm
The optimization problem in (26) is an Assignment Problem
[26], which can be solved using the Hungarian algorithm
[23]-[25]. The time complexity of the Hungarian algorithm
is O(n3) in the worst situation and the space complexity is
O(n2) [19].
The Hungarian algorithm is based on the following two
lemmas [25]:
Lemma 3: Let F ′i,j = Fi,j + aj + bi, where aj and bi are
constants, j = 1, . . . , N , and i = 1, . . . , N . Then, replacing
Fi,j with F
′
i,j in the objective function in (26) we have
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
F ′i,jyi,j =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(Fi,j + aj + bi)yi,j
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Fi,jyi,j +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(aj + bi)yi,j
(28)
where
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1(aj + bi)yi,j =
∑N
j=1 aj +
∑N
i=1 bi is a
constant.
Lemma 4: If some elements of a matrix are zeroes and
the other elements are not zeroes, then the least number of
rows and columns that contain all the zero elements is equal
to the largest number of independent zeroes, which are the
zero elements in different rows or in different columns. The
multiple zero elements in the same row or column are regarded
as one independent zero.
In the previous subsection, when M < N , we transform
matrix S to matrix S′, and transform matrix S′ to matrix F,
which satisfies the initial condition in the Hungarian algorithm
[19]. In the algorithm designed in this paper based on the
Hungarian algorithm, we define the ♣ as the zero element
which has only one zero element in it and replace other zero
elements with ♢ in the same column with ♣. Based on Lemma
3 and 4, the Hungarian algorithm can be implemented as
follows:
Step I: Simplify matrix F.
(i) Fi,j = Fi,j −minNi′=1(Fi′,j), ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
(ii) Fi,j = Fi,j −minNj′=1(Fi,j′), ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Algorithm 1 Content-sharing incentive and provider selection
(CIPS) algorithm
Input:
The set of N content requesters D = {d1, d2, . . . , dN}; the
set of M potential providers Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QM}; each
potential provider Qj has its historical content-sharing partic-
ipation record Wj and historical content-sharing safety record
Gj(j = 1, 2, . . . ,M); the size of content requested by di is
Xi(i = 1, 2, . . . , N).
Steps:
for content requester di(i = 1, 2, . . . , N) do
di asks the eNB for a content with size Xi.
The eNB broadcasts the content information, i.e., the location
of di to estimate CSI and Rj , the Xi to estimate Ej , to the
potential providers Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QM}.
If Qj has the requested content, Qj will respond to the eNB
with estimated transmission rate Rj and energy cost Ej for
sending the content to di via D2D link; otherwise, it does not
responds.
The eNB calculates the CSM score of potential provider Qj .
(i) If Qj has the requested content:
SHj =
1
2
(Wj +Gj) according to (4)-(7); S
R
j = S
R
j−1−
bj according to (8)-(12); S
P
j =
minMj=1(Pj)
Pj
according
to (13)-(17);
then, STj = S
H
j + S
R
j + S
P
j ;
STj =
STj
maxM
j=1
ST
j
;
Si,j = S
T
j .
(ii) If Qj dose not have the requested content: Si,j = 0.
end for
Si,j(i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M) form the matrix S, S is
transformed to F as in (24)-(26), and the Hungarian algorithm
is adopted as described in Section IV-B to optimally assign
providers to the requesters. For the requesters without any
selected provider, the eNB will send the content directly.
for each content requester di that has been assigned a provider
Qk do
If the D2D content-sharing process fails, di will inform the
eNB of its received content sizeXi, and the eNB will send the
remaining content to di and pay the reward P =
X′i
Xi
Ai,k to
provider Qk (Eq.(14), (16)). If D2D content-sharing process
completes, di will inform the eNB of the actual transmission
rate R′k, and the eNB will pay P =
R′k
Rk
Pi,k to provider Qk.
Historical supply record Wk and Gk will be updated accord-
ing to (6) and (7), respectively, by the eNB .
end for
Step II: Find the independent zero elements
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(i) Mark the zero element which is the only zero in a row
with ♣, then replace the other zero elements in the same
column of that ♣ with ♢.
(ii) Mark the zero element which is the only zero in a column
with ♣ , then replace the other zero elements in the same
row of that ♣ with ♢.
(iii) Repeat (i) and (ii) in Step II to mark and replace as many
zero elements as possible.
(iv) If there are zero elements that have not been marked
or replaced, then first select the row with the least zero
elements, find the column with the least zero elements
among the columns containing the zero elements of the
selected row, mark the zero element belonging to both
the selected row and column with ♣, and then replace
the other zero elements in the selected row and column
with ♢. Repeat this step until all the zero elements have
been marked or replaced.
(v) Denote the number of ♣ elements in matrix F as K. If K
= N , the optimal solution to the assignment problem in
(26) is obtained and the algorithm terminates. If K < N ,
go to Step III.
Step III: Find the least number of rows and columns that
can contain all the remaining zero elements in matrix F.
(i) Mark each row without any ♣ with √.
(ii) For each row labeled with
√
, mark all the columns that
contain a ♢ or a ♣ belonging to that row with √.
(iii) Repeat (ii) of Step III, until there is no more row or
column that can be marked with
√
.
(iv) Cross each row without
√
with a horizontal line and
cross each column without
√
with a vertical line, then
denote l as the total number of lines, which cross out
all the rows and columns that contain all the remaining
zero elements.
If l ̸= N , then there must be a mistake in the previous
process, and go back to (iv) of Step II. If l = N , go to Step
IV.
Step IV: Introduce N independent zero elements in matrix
F.
(i) Find the minimum element θ among the elements that
are not crossed by any line.
(ii) Subtract θ from each element of all the rows labeled with√
.
(iii) Add θ to each element of all the columns labeled with√
(to guarantee there is no negative element in F);
(iv) Return to Step II.
When the above algorithm terminates, we obtain a matrix F
which contains one and only one ♣ element in each row and
in each column. For each content requester di, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
if Fk,i = ♣, k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, then, provider Qk is selected to
transmit content to requester di via D2D.
C. Content-sharing Incentive and Provider Selection Algorith-
m
Based on the proposed CSM and the Hungarian algorithm,
we devise the CIPS algorithm (Algorithm 1) to motivate the
participation of candidate content providers and assign them
optimally to the content requesters.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the
performance of the proposed CSM and CIPS algorithm. We
consider a single-cell with 10 content requesters and various
numbers of content providers and CUEs. The size of requested
content is a logarithmic distributed between 0MBytes and
100MBytes[23]. The historical content supply record of each
potential provider is a random value uniformly distributed in
[0,1]. The probability for each requester to request one of the
N available contents is 1
N
. Other key parameters are listed in
Table I. Both pathloss and shadow fading are considered for
each cellular or D2D link.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter & Value
Cell radius & 250m
D2D Bandwidth & 10MHz
α & 2
Noise spectral density & −174
dBm/Hz
µC & 23dbm
µQ & 20dbm
λD & 1/(pi· 250
2)
SINR threshold of the D2D re-
quester & 0dB
A. Performance of Comprehensive Scoring Mechanism
Fig.3 plots the maximum score, the minimum score and the
score of selected provider (SP) among all providers versus the
total number of providers calculated with CSM. In addition,
the maximum score, the minimum score and the score of SP
are the average values among 1000 simulations. Fig.3(a) shows
the relationship between SH and the number of providers. It
can be observed that with the increasing number of providers,
both the maximum score and the score of SP increase, while
the minimum score decreases. Fig.3(b) illustrates the relation-
ship between SR and the number of providers. It shows that
with the increasing of number of providers, the minimum score
decreases, while both the maximum score and the score of
SP almost remain unchanged. Fig.3(c) shows the relationship
between SP and the number of providers. We can see that
with the increasing number of providers, the maximum score
remains at one, the minimum score decreases, and the score
of SP increases. Fig. 3 reveals that: i) the historical score and
expected reward of the selected provider will increase as the
candidate group becomes larger, as more potential providers
participate the competition; ii) the SR of the selected provider
is always high (close to the highest SR of all candidates)
regardless of the increase of the group size, since the highest
data rate is limited by the maximum transmission power and
the minimum D2D distance; iii) the score of SP is not the
highest in all three subplots, since ST reflects the balance of
SH , SR and SP .
Fig.4 presents the probability of being selected versus
SH , SR and SP in the simulations. It reveals that with the
increasing of SH , the probability of being selected increases
until the score goes beyond 0.9, then the probability starts to
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Fig. 3. The maximum score, the minimum score and the score of SP among
all providers versus the total number of providers calculated by the CSM
decrease, since a very a high SH leads to a high reward, which
can decrease SP significantly. Interestingly, when SP < 0.35,
no provider is selected; the maximum probability of being
selected is achieved at SP = 0.4. It is because when SP is
of a higher value, SH has a lower value, which decreases
the probability of being selected. The inflection points in the
curves of SH and SP reflect the relationship between them
in the probability of being selected. It can also be observed
that when SR < 0.75, no provider is selected, then with the
increase of SR, the probability of being selected increases
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Fig. 5. Actual rewards of three types of providers versus the number of
content sharing.
rapidly. It indicates that providers with higher transmission
rates are more likely to be selected.
B. Incentive and Safety
We simulate the received rewards of three types of content
providers (i.e., normal providers, negative providers and unsafe
providers) in 10 content sharing events, so as to reveal the
impact of CSM on the incentive and safety issues in D2D
content sharing. A normal provider is always willing to share
content with others and will never provide unsafe data files.
A negative provider only wants to receive content from others
but seldom provides content. An unsafe provider would like to
share content but may provide files containing virus, worms,
or trojan horses. Accordingly, a negative behavior refers to
the act of a candidate provider refusing to share content,
while an unsafe behavior refers to the act of a candidate
provider sending false content or even virus to the content
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requester. In Fig.5, we set the initial values of Wj and Gj
as Wj = Gj = 0.4, 0.6 and 0.5 for normal providers,
negative providers and unsafe providers, respectively. It can
be observed that initially the unsafe providers receives the
highest reward because of its highest initial SH . However, its
received reward suddenly drops at content sharing number 2
and 5 due to its unsafe behavior, and reduces to the lowest
among the three providers after 10 content sharing processes.
Similarly, the received reward of the negative provider is
higher than the normal provider at the beginning , but suddenly
decrease at content sharing number 3 and number 6 due to
its negative behavior. But after some active participations, it
finally increases to be the second highest. The received reward
of the normal provider increases and becomes the highest
at last. Fig.6 shows the total received reward and the total
expected reward of all three types of providers at the end
of the simulation, where the expected reward is the reward
which could have been gained if without any negative and
unsafe behavior. It is obvious that the actually received rewards
of both the negative provider and unsafe provider are much
lower than their expected rewards, while the normal provider
receives a reward equals to the expected value. Fig.5 and Fig.6
indicate that the proposed CSM would be able to discourage
the negative and unsafe behaviors of providers by adaptively
controlling their received rewards.
C. Quality of Service
We evaluate the performance of the proposed CIPS algorith-
m for different numbers of providers. Fig.7 shows the average
comprehensive score of the SP versus the number of potential
content providers. As shown in Fig.7, the average maximum
comprehensive score is 1, and the average comprehensive
score of the selected providers for each requester is the average
score of selected content providers for 10 content requesters
by using CIPS. From Fig.7, we can see that the increasing
number of potential providers, the average comprehensive
score of SP increases. This is because assigning potential
providers to different content requesters may appear repeat,
which can reduce the average comprehensive score of the
selected providers.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated the content-sharing
incentive and provider selection problem for D2D communi-
cations underlaying cellular network. We propose CSM, which
calculates a score for each candidate content provider based on
their historical content supply record, current transmission rate
and expected reward. Based on the CSM and the Hungarian
algorithm, we devise a content-sharing incentive and provider
selection (CIPS) algorithm to optimize the selection of content
providers for multiple concurrent content requesters. Numer-
ical results have shown that the proposed CSM can promote
UEs to participate in D2D content sharing as frequently
as possible without any malicious behaviors by controlling
the received reward of providers. The proposed CIPS can
assign optimal content providers to each content requester and
increase the average comprehensive score of selected providers
with the increase number of content providers.
It should be noted that in realistic D2D content-sharing sys-
tems, the physical contact period within D2D communications
distance may impose a limitation on D2D content sharing.
In our future work, we will investigate the life time of D2D
pairs and the probability of content-sharing completion using
realistic human mobility models.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Doppler, M. Rinne, C. Wijting, C. B. Ribeiro and K. Hugl, ”Device-
to-device communication as an underlay to LTE-advanced networks,” in
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 47, no. 12, pp. 42-49, Dec. 2009.
[2] ”Cellular Offloading in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks With D2D
Communication Assistance,” in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Tech-
nology, vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 4245-4255, May 2017.
[3] ”AC-POCA: Anti-Coordination Game based Partially Overlapping
Channels Assignment in Combined UAV and D2D based Networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 1672-
1683, Feb. 2018.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 6, NO. 1, JANUARY 2007 11
[4] ”A New Data Transmission Strategy in Mobile D2D NetworksłDeter-
ministic, Greedy, or Planned Opportunistic Routing?,” in IEEE Trans-
actions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 594-609, Jan. 2017.
[5] ”Interference Graph-Based Resource Allocation (InGRA) for D2D Com-
munications Underlaying Cellular Networks,” in IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 3844-3850, Aug. 2015.
[6] J. Jiang, S. Zhang, B. Li and B. Li, ”Maximized Cellular Traffic
Offloading via Device-to-Device Content Sharing,” in IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 82-91, Jan. 2016.
[7] L. Xiong and L. Liu, ”PeerTrust: supporting reputation-based trust
for peer-to-peer electronic communities,” in IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 843-857, July
2004.
[8] R. Zhou and K. Hwang, ”PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation
System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing,” in IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 460-473, April
2007.
[9] Michiardi, Pietro, and R. Molva, Core: A Collaborative Reputation
Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security. Springer US,
2002, pp. 107-121.
[10] Y. Zhang and Y. Fang, ”A Fine-Grained Reputation System for Reliable
Service Selection in Peer-to-Peer Networks,” in IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 1134-1145, Aug.
2007.
[11] R. Zhou, K. Hwang and M. Cai, ”GossipTrust for Fast Reputation
Aggregation in Peer-to-Peer Networks,” in IEEE Transactions on Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering, vol. 20, no. 9, pp. 1282-1295, Sept. 2008.
[12] Y. Zhang, S. Chen and G. Yang, ”SFTrust: A double trust metric
based trust model in unstructured P2P system,” 2009 IEEE International
Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, Rome, 2009, pp. 1-
7.
[13] Y. Zhang, L. Song, W. Saad, Z. Dawy and Z. Han, ”Contract-Based
Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular
Networks,” in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol.
33, no. 10, pp. 2144-2155, Oct. 2015.
[14] Z. Hasan and V. K. Bhargava, ”Relay Selection for OFDM Wireless
Systems under Asymmetric Information: A Contract-Theory Based
Approach,” in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 12,
no. 8, pp. 3824-3837, August 2013.
[15] S. Zhong, J. Chen and Y. R. Yang, ”Sprite: a simple, cheat-proof, credit-
based system for mobile ad-hoc networks,” IEEE INFOCOM 2003.
Twenty-second Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37428), 2003, pp. 1987-
1997.
[16] Y. S. Sun, M. L. Lu, Y. C. Pan and M. C. Chen, ”Optimal Incentive-
Compatible Pricing for Dynamic Bandwidth Trading and Allocation in
Efficient Spectrum Management,” 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunica-
tions Conference - GLOBECOM 2011, Houston, TX, USA, 2011, pp.
1-6.
[17] Vishnumurthy, Vivek, S. Ch, and E. G. U. Sirer. ”KARMA : A
Secure Economic Framework for Peer-To-Peer Resource Sharing.” 1ST
WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS (2003).
[18] Sirivianos, Michael, ”Dandelion: cooperative content distribution with
robust incentives.” Usenix Technical Conference, June 17-22, 2007,
Santa Clara, Ca, Usa, 2007, pp. 157-170.
[19] J. Park and M. van der Schaar, ”Pricing and Incentives in Peer-to-Peer
Networks,” 2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, San Diego, CA, 2010,
pp. 1-9.
[20] Alotaibi, F., Hosny, S., El Gamal, H., Eryilmaz, A. ” A game theoretic
approach to content trading in proactive wireless networks.” 2216-2220.
[21] Chen, Zhuoqun, et al. ”Caching incentive design in wireless D2D net-
works: A Stackelberg game approach.” IEEE International Conference
on Communications IEEE, 2016.
[22] Dell’Amico, Mauro, and P. Toth. ”Algorithms and codes for dense
assignment problems: the state of the art.” Discrete Applied Mathematics
100.1-2(2000), pp. 17-48.
[23] Yan Chaobo and Zhao Qianchuan, ”Advances in Assignment Problem
and comparison of algorithms,” 2008 27th Chinese Control Conference,
Kunming, 2008, pp. 607-611.
[24] LAWLER E L. Combinatorial Optimization: Networks and Matroids.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976.
[25] KUHN HW. The Hungarian Method for the Assignment Problem. Naval
Research Logistics, 2005, 52(1), pp. 7-21.
[26] R. S. Pindyck and D. L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, sixth edition,
Pearson Education Inc, 2005.
[27] Hua, Chen. ”FTP Files’ Distribution Characteristics and Their Implica-
tions.” Computer Engineering and Applications 40.1(2004):129-133.
